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In a series of papers (e.g. Zezza and Dos Santos, 2004; Dos Santos, 2004a, 2004b) we 
have argued that the so-called ￿stock-flow consistent approach￿ (SFCA) to 
macroeconomic modeling not only provides a rigorous foundation for post-Keynesian 
macroeconomics but is also a relatively unexplored frontier of (various schools of) 
Keynesian macroeconomics
1.  
We have noted also that the increase in analytical rigor allowed by the SFCA does 
not come without a price. More often than not, SFC models are too big to be analytically 
treatable and can only be analyzed with the help of computer simulations. Since the 
￿reality￿ post-Keynesian SFC models try to approximate is complex, this is hardly 
surprising
2. On the other hand, we do acknowledge that an analytically treatable version 
of our models would help the presentation of our ideas considerably. This paper aims 
precisely to present one such version.  
In fact, we believe that the model presented here￿which builds on previous 
efforts by Godley and Cripps (1983), Godley (e.g. 1996, 1999), Lavoie and Godley 
(2001-2002), Taylor (1991), and Tobin (e.g. 1980, 1982), among others￿is intuitive and 
general enough to be considered a ￿baseline￿ (didactic) SFC post-Keynesian model
3. As 
we hope to make clear to the reader, it sheds light on a wealth of classic post-Keynesian 
macroeconomic issues, and (just like the old IS/LM model) can easily be modified to 
address several other ones (or the previous ones from different theoretical perspectives).  
What follows is divided in four parts. First we present the ￿structural￿ hypotheses 
of the model and the logical (accounting) constraints imposed by them. Second, we 
￿close￿ the accounting constraints with a specific set of post-Keynesian behavioral 
hypotheses
4. Third, we discuss the ￿short period￿ and ￿long period￿ properties of our 
specific ￿closure.￿ We finish with a brief discussion of possible extensions and 
simplifications of the model.   
                                                     
1 Essentially the same points were noted well before us￿with different terminologies￿by Tobin (1980, 
1982), Godley and Cripps (1983), and Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002), among others.  
2 The adjective post-Keynesian is used here in the sense of Palley (1996) and Lavoie (1992).  
3 Conceived as a simplified version of Zezza and Dos Santos (2004), the model presented here ended up 
being very close in spirit to ￿the￿ ￿heterodox model￿ by Foley and Taylor (2004). 
4 Though, following Taylor (1991, 2004), we readily agree that several other ￿closures￿ are possible. 
Moudud (1998), for example, presents a ￿classical￿ analysis of an economy similar to the one above.     
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1.  THE STRUCTURE OF OUR ARTIFICIAL ECONOMY 
 
The economy assumed here has households, firms (which produce a single good, with 
price p), banks and a government sector
5. The aggregated assets and liabilities of these 
institutional sectors are presented in table 1 below. 
Table 1 summarizes several theoretical assumptions. First and foremost, the 
economy assumed here is a ￿pure credit￿ one, i.e. all transactions are paid with bank 
checks
6. Moreover, the banking sector is supposed to remunerate deposits at the T-bill 
rate (making profits only through their loans to firms), so households do not care to buy 
T-bills themselves, keeping their wealth only in the form of bank deposits and equities
7. 
The banking sector is also assumed to: (i) accept government debt as means of payment 
for government deficits
8; (ii) not pay taxes; and (iii) to distribute all its profits (so its net 
worth is equal to zero)
9. Finally, firms are assumed to finance their investment using 
loans, equity emission and retained profits. The Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem does 
not hold in this economy, so the specific way firms choose (or find) to finance themselves 
matters and their net worth is not necessarily zero (i.e. Tobin￿s q is not necessarily 1)
10.   
                                                     
5 Dos Santos (2004b) argues that these are quintessential features of the economies studied by ￿Financial 
Keynesian￿ authors (such as Davidson, 1972; Godley, 1999; Minsky, 1986; and Tobin, 1980). Similar 
economies have been studied in a long series of papers by Reiner Franke, Willi Semmler, and associates, at 
least since Franke and Semmler (1989).      
6 A similar simplifying hypothesis is adopted in Godley and Cripps (1983, chapter 5). Section 4 discusses 
the implications of relaxing it.   
7 According to Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003, p.43), a banking sector with these characteristics ￿is not too 
different from what may emerge in the fairly near future in the USA.￿ In any case, this hypothesis allows us 
to simplify the portfolio choice of households considerably. More detailed treatments (such as the ones in 
Tobin, 1980; or Lavoie and Godley, 2001-2002) can easily be introduced, though only at the cost of 
making the algebra considerably heavier (see section 4 for a discussion).   
8 Here we will work with the conventional case in which B>0, noting that not too long ago (in the Clinton 
years, to be precise) many analysts were discussing the consequences of the U.S government paying all its 
debt. A negative B (i.e. a positive government net worth) would be interpreted in this model as ￿net central 
bank advances￿ to the banking sector as a whole.  
9 We are also simplifying away banks￿ (and government￿s) investment in fixed capital, as well as their 
intermediary consumption (wages, etc). These assumptions are made only to allow for simpler 
mathematical expressions for household income and aggregate investment.     
10 As Delli Gatti et al. (1994, footnote 13) point out, ￿ the greater the ratio of equity to debt financing the 
greater the chance that the firm will be a hedge financing unit.￿ This ￿Minskyan￿ point is, of course, lost in 
models in which firms issue only one form of debt.   
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  Table 1: Aggregate Balance Sheets of the Institutional Sectors. 
pe  stands for the price of one equity. 
  Households Firms Banks  Government   
Row 
Totals
1-Bank Deposits                      +D   -D    0 
2-Bank Loans            -L  +L    0 
3-T-Bills         +B  -B 0 
4-Capital Goods         +  p•K    + p•K 
5-Equities   +E•pe -E•pe     0 
6-Net Worth (Column Totals)    + Vh  + Vf  0  -B  + p•K 
  
 
Table 2 below shows the ￿current flows￿ associated with the stocks above. As such, it 
(rigorously) represents very intuitive phenomena
11. Households in virtually all capitalist 
economies receive income in the form of wages, interest on deposits, and distributed profits (of 
banks and firms) and use it to buy consumption goods, pay taxes and save (as depicted in the 
households￿ column of table 2)
12. The government, in turn, receives money from taxes and uses it 
to buy goods from firms and pay interest on its (lagged stock of) debt, while firms use sales 
receipts to pay wages, taxes, interest on their (lagged stock of) loans, and dividends, retaining the 
rest to help finance investment. Finally, banks receive money from their loans to firms and 
holdings of Treasury bills and use it to pay interest on households￿ deposits and dividends. In a 
￿closed system￿ like ours every money flow has to ￿come from somewhere and go somewhere￿ 
(Godley, 1999, p.394), and this shows up in the fact that all row totals of table 2 are zero.   
                                                     
11 A numerical example in section 3 aims to provide further assistance to the reader in understanding 
exactly how the artificial economy presented here operates.     
12We are simplifying household debt and housing investment, however.       
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Table 2: ￿Current￿ transactions in our artificial economy 
 A (+) sign before a variable denotes a receipt while a (-) sign denotes a payment. 
  Households  Non Financial Firms 
Currrent           Capital 
Govt.   Banks  Row Totals
1-Cons.   -C    +C  - - - 0 
2-Govt. 
Expenditures  




-  +p•∆K -p•∆K
14  - - 0 
4-Accounting Memo (1): ￿Final￿ Sales at market prices ≡ p•X = C + G + p•∆K ≡ W + FT ≡ Y 
5-Wages  +W    -W  - - - 0 
6-Taxes        -Tw  -Tf - +T -  0 
7-Interest on 
Loans 








+ ib-1•D-1  - - -  -  ib-1•D-1 0 
10-Dividends  +Ff  + Fb  -Ff   -  -  -Fb  0 
11-Column 
Totals  
SAVh Fu -p•∆K  SAVg 0  0 
 
If it is true that beginning of period stocks necessarily affect income flows (and, 
as we shall see, asset prices), it is also true that saving flows and capital gains necessarily 
affect end of period stocks
15. This is shown in table 3. Given the hypotheses above, 
households￿ saving necessarily implies changes in their holdings of bank deposits and/or 
stocks, while government deficits are necessarily financed with the emission of T-bills, 
                                                     
13We follow here the broad Keynesian literature in simplifying away investment in inventories (which plays 
a crucial role in Godley and Cripps, 1983 and Shaikh, 1989). These can be easily introduced (say, along the 
lines of Godley, 1999), though only at the cost of increasing the complexity of the model.     
14 Firms￿ investment expenditures in physical capital imply a change in their financial or capital assets and, 
therefore, is a ￿capital￿ transaction. As such it (re)appears in table 3 below. The reason it is included in 
table 2 is to stress the idea that firms buy their capital goods from themselves, an obvious feature of the real 
world (though a slightly odd assumption in our ￿one good economy￿) .      
15 Fluctuations in the price of the single good produced in the economy (for firms) and in the market value 
of equities (for firms and households) are the only sources of nominal capital gains and losses in this 
economy.  
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and investment is necessarily financed by a combination of retained earnings, equity 
emissions and bank loans. As emphasized by Godley (1999), the banking sector plays a 
crucial role in making sure these inter-related balance sheet changes are mutually 
consistent
16.   
 
Table 3: Flows of Funds in our artificial economy  
Positive figures denote sources of funds, while negative ones denote uses of funds. 
   Households Firms Banks Govt. Row  Totals 
Current Saving  +SAVh +Fu 0  +SAVg +SAV 
∆bank deposits  - ∆D   +  ∆D   0 
∆loans   +  ∆L -  ∆L   0 
∆Treasury Bills     -  ∆B +∆B 0 
∆capital    - p•∆K     -p•∆K 
∆equities  - ∆E•pe +  ∆E•pe    0 
Column Totals  0 0  0  0 0 










  Before we continue, we must remind the reader that all accounts presented so far 
were phrased in nominal terms. All stocks and flows in tables 1 and 2 above have 
straightforward ￿real￿ counterparts given by their nominal value divided by p (the price 
of the single good produced in the economy), while the ￿real￿ capital gains in equities are 
given by:  
∆pet•E-1/pt ￿ ∆p•pe-1E-1/p-1•pt; 




                                                     
16 As is well known, most macroeconomic models assume that some sort of Walrasian auctioneer takes care 
of financial intermediation. We believe this simplification is not faithful to the views of financially 
sophisticated post-Keynesians (such as Davidson, 1972; Godley and Cripps, 1983; and Minsky, 1986), 
though.    
17 Given that ours is a ￿one good￿ economy, the real value of physical capital is not affected by inflation.      
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2.  A FIX-PRICE SIMPLIFIED POST-KEYNESIAN CLOSURE 
 
We shall work here with a simplified ￿fix-price￿ version of the model, leaving the 
discussion of extensions to part 4.  
 
2.1 Aggregate Supply 
Following Taylor (1991, chapter 2), we assume that:  
(E1) p = w•b•(1+τ);  
where  p =price level, w = money wage per unit of labor, b = labor-output ratio, and τ = 
mark up rate. From (1) it is easy to prove that the (gross, before tax) profit share on total 
income (π) is given by: 
(E2) π = [p•X - W]/p•X = τ/(1+ τ);  
so that the (before tax) wage share on total income is: 
(E3) 1 - π = W/ p•X = 1/(1+ τ); 
and W =  (1 ￿ π)•p•X.  
We assume here that the price level, the technology, and the income distribution of the 
economy are exogenous, so all lower case variables above are constant (i.e. the aggregate 
supply of the model is horizontal)
18.      
 
2.2  Aggregate Demand 
2.2.1  A ￿Kaleckian SFC￿ Consumption Function. 
The hypothesis here is that production workers spend all they get after taxes, while 
￿capitalist households￿ spend a fraction of their (lagged) wealth (as opposed to their 
current income, as in Kalecki)
19. The rationale for this simplification is the idea that rich 
people are more concerned with their wealth than with their income
20. Formally,  
(E4a) C = W - Tw + a•Vh-1 = W•(1-θ) + a•Vh-1; 
                                                     
18 All these assumptions can be relaxed, of course, provided one is willing to pay the price of increased 
analytical complexity.  
19 The term ￿capitalist households￿ is used here to designate rentiers and managerial workers. In other 
words, the wages of managerial workers are assumed to be a part of the distributed profits of firms.  
20 More realistic assumptions could easily be introduced, though only at the cost of making the algebra 
considerably heavier.   
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where θ is the income tax rate and a is a fixed parameter
21. Following Taylor (1991), we  
normalize the expression above by the (lagged) value of the stock of capital
22 to get:      
(E4) C/p•K-1 = (1 ￿ π)•(1-θ)•u + a•vh-1;  
where u = X/K-1, and vh-1 = Vh-1/ p•K-1. 
 
2.2.2  A ￿Structuralist￿ Investment Function: 
The simplest version of the model presented here uses Taylor￿s (1991, chapter 5) 
￿structuralist￿ investment function (which, in turn, is an extension of the one used in 
Marglin and Bhaduri, 1990)
23:   
(E5) g
i(π, u, i) = go + (α•π + β) •u ￿ θ1•i; 
 
where g
i(π, u, i) = ∆K/ K-1, i is the interest rate on loans, and go, α, β, and θ1 are exogenous 
parameters measuring the state of long term expectations (go), the strength of the 
￿accelerator￿ effect (α and β), and the sensibility of aggregate investment to increases in 
the interest rate on bank loans (θ1). In part 4 we discuss what happens when one modifies 
this investment function along the lines suggested by Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002).  
2.2.3 ￿ The ￿u￿ Curve 
 
                                                     
21 As discussed below, we assume that Tw = θ•W (i.e. that capitalist households￿ income is not taxed). 
22Taylor uses the current stock of capital because he works in continuous time. As both the formalization 
and the checking (through computer simulations) of stock-flow consistency requirements are reasonably 
complex in continuous time (and no proportional insight appears to be added), we work here in discrete 
time and assume (as Keynes) that the stock of capital available in any given ￿short period￿ is pre-
determined (i.e. that investment does not translate into capital instantaneously).   
23Though, as noted by Foley and Taylor (2004, p.2), we could easily have assumed also a ￿Harrodian￿ (or 
￿Classical￿) specification in which investment demand would adjust gradually to stabilize long-run 
capacity utilization (as proposed, among others, by Shaikh, 1989 and Godley, 1996). On the same vein, 
Skott (1989) provides a possible rationalization for the ￿desired￿ stock (of physical capital)￿flow (of final 
sales) of firms.       
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Assuming that both γ= G/ p•K-1 and i are given by policy, the (￿short period￿) 
goods￿ market equilibrium condition is given by: 
p•X = W•(1-θ) + a•Vh-1 + [go + (α•π + β)•u  ￿ θ1•i]•p•K-1+ γ•p•K-1; 
or, after trivial algebraic manipulations, 
(E6) u =  [a•vh-1 + go - θ1•i  + γ] / [1 - (1 - π)•(1-θ) - (α•π + β)]; 
which is essentially the normalized ￿IS￿ curve of the model. In fact, the ￿short period￿ 
equilibrium of the model has a straightforward ￿IS-LM￿ (of sorts) representation, which 
implies that ￿short period￿ comparative static exercises can be done quite simply (more 
on this below). Note finally that, the (temporary, goods￿ market) equilibrium above only 
makes economic sense if the sum of the propensity to consume out of current income [i.e. 
(1-π)•(1-θ)] and the ￿accelerator￿ effect  [i.e  α•π + β] is smaller than one.      
 
2.3   Financial Behavior and Markets  
Up until now, the model is very similar to, say, ￿modern￿ ￿new Keynesian consensus￿ 
ones. Indeed, even though neither a Philips￿ curve relation nor a ￿monetary policy rule￿ 
were assumed, we could easily close the model along these lines. Contrarily to ￿new 
consensus￿ models, however, our IS equation depends on the distribution of income and 
on capitalist households￿ stock of wealth. Moreover, we do not ignore/trivialize the 
financial structure of the economy, so we still have a lot of ground to cover.    
 
2.3.1 ￿ Financial Behavior of Households 
The two crucial hypotheses here are that: (i) households make no expectation mistakes 
concerning the value of Vh
24, and (ii) the share δ of equity (and, of course, the share 1- δ 
of deposits) on total household wealth depends negatively (positively) on ib and 
positively (negatively) on the expectational parameter ρ. Formally we have that: 
(E7) pe•E
d = δ•Vh; 
(E8) D
d = (1 - δ)•Vh; and  
(E9) δ = -ib + ρ; 
 
                                                     
24 The inclusion of expectation errors (say, along the lines of Godley, 1999), would imply the inclusion of 
hypotheses about how households react to these errors, making the model ￿heavier.￿  
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where  ρ  is assumed to be constant in this simplified ￿closure￿
25. The value of Vh, on the 
other hand, is given by the households￿ budget constraint (see table 3 above): 
Vh ≡Vh-1 +SAVh +∆pe•E-1 ; 
while from table 2 and (E4), it is easy to see that SAVh =  ib-1•D-1 + Ff + Fb - a•Vh-1,  
so that: 
(E10) Vh = (1 - a)•Vh-1 + ib-1•D-1 + Ff + Fb +∆pe•E-1. 
 
2.3.2 ￿ Financial Behavior of Firms 
For simplicity, we assume that firms keep a fixed E/K rate (χ) and distribute a fixed share 
￿ of its (after-tax, net of interest payments) profits
26, so that:  
(E11) E
s = χ•K = χ•K-1•(1+g
i);   
(E12) Ff = ￿•[(1-θ)•π•u•p•K-1 - i-1•L-1]; and 
(E13) Fu =(1 - ￿) •[(1-θ)•π•u•p•K-1 - i-1•L-1]. 
And, as the price of equity (pe) is supposed to clear the market, we have also that:  
(E14) E
s = E
d; so that (from E7 and E11): 
(E15) pe= δ•Vh/(χ•K).    
Firms￿ demand for bank loans, in turn, can be obtained by replacing (E5), (E11), 
and (E13) in their budget constraint (see table 3). Indeed, from   
∆L ≡ p•∆K - pe•∆E - Fu, it is easy to see that (assuming that χ = χ -1):     
(E16) L
d = (1 + i-1 - ￿•i-1)•L-1 + g
i•p•K-1 - pe•g
i•χ•K-1  ￿ (1- ￿)•(1-θ)•π•u•p•K-1 
2.3.3 ￿ Financial Behavior of Banks and the Government  
For simplicity, banks are assumed here (a la Lavoie and Godley, 2001-2002) to 
provide loans as demanded by firms
27. In fact, banks￿ behavior is essentially passive in 
the simplified model discussed here, for we also assume that (i) banks always accept 
                                                     
25 Though it plays a crucial role in Taylor and O￿Connel￿s (1985) seminal ￿Minskyan￿ model. The 
simplified specification above is perhaps an extreme version of Keynes￿ (1997 [1936], p.154) view that the 
demand for equities ￿(￿)is established as the outcome of the mass psychology of a large number of 
ignorant individuals (..)￿ and, therefore, is ￿liable to change violently as the result of a sudden fluctuation in 
opinion due to factors that do not really much make difference to the prospective yield (￿)￿. Specifications 
connecting δ to expected dividends (as, for example, the one in Zezza and Dos Santos, 2004) could also 
have been used, of course, though only at the cost of making the algebra heavier.      
26 Varying χ  and ￿ can be easily introduced, though only at the cost of making the algebra heavier. Note, 
however, that the hypothesis of a relatively constant χ is roughly in line with the influential New-
Keynesian literature on ￿equity rationing￿  (see Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003, chapter 2 for a quick survey).  
27 We discuss a ￿credit crunch￿ regime in part 4.  
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deposits from households and T-bills from the government, (ii) banks distribute whatever 
profits they make
28, and (iii) the interest rate on loans is a fixed mark up on the interest 
rate on T-bills. Formally:  
(E17) L
s = L
d = L; 
(E18) D
s = D
d = D; 
(E19) Bb
d = B
s = B; 
(E20) i = (1+ τb)•ib, and   
(E21) Fb = i-1•L-1+ ib-1•Bb-1- ib-1•D-1. 
 
The behavior of the government sector is also very simple. Its taxes are a fixed 
proportion of wages and gross profits, its purchases of goods are a fixed proportion of the 
(lagged) stock of capital, its supply of T-bills is given by its budget constraint (see tables 
2 and 3 above), and the interest rate on T-bills is whatever it decides it is. Formally,    
(E22) G = γ•p•K-1; 
(E23) T = Tw + Tf  = θ•W + θ•(p•X - W) = θ•p•X; 
(E24) B
s = (1 + ib-1)•B-1 + γ•p•K-1 -  θ•p•X; and 
(E25) ib = ib*. 
 
3.  COMPLETE ￿TEMPORARY￿ AND ￿STEADY STATE￿ SOLUTIONS 
 
One of the methodological advantages of the SFCA is that it allows for a natural 
integration of ￿short￿ and ￿long￿ periods. In particular, both Keynesian notions of ￿long 
period equilibrium￿ and ￿long run￿ acquire a precise sense in a SFC context, the former 
being the steady-state equilibrium of the stock-flow system (assuming that all parameters 
remain constant through the adjustment process), and the latter being the more realist 
notion of a path-dependent sequence of ￿short periods￿ in which the parameters are 
subject to sudden and unpredictable changes
. These concepts are discussed in more detail 
in section 3.2 below. Before we do that, however, we need to discuss the characteristics 
of the ￿short period￿ (or ￿temporary￿) equilibrium of the model.       
                                                     
28 Under this assumption allowing banks to hold a fraction δ* of its deposits in equities is one and the same 
thing of adding δ* to δ (hence our hypothesis that only households buy equities). Assuming that the banks￿ 
net worth can differ from zero would only make the algebra considerably more complex, however.       
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3.1  The ￿Short Period￿ Equilibrium   
In any given (beginning of) period, the stocks of the economy are given, inherited from 
history. The solution of the model under these hypotheses is discussed in section 3.1.1 
below, while an intuitive numerical example is discussed in section 3.1.2.     
 
3.1.1 ￿ The Analytics of the ￿Short Period￿ Equilibrium 
As discussed in section 2.2.3 given Vh-1, K-1, distribution parameters, and fiscal and 
monetary policy, the (normalized) level of economic activity is trivially given by:     
(E6) u =  [a•vh-1 + go - θ1•i  + γ] / [1 - (1 - π)•(1-θ) - (α•π + β)] 
29. 
But (demand-driven) economic activity is hardly the only variable determined in 
any given ￿period.￿ Equally important are the stock (i.e. balance sheet) implications of 
the sectoral income and expenditure flows and portfolio decisions (for end of period 
stocks necessarily affect income flows in the next period). Fortunately, it is 
straightforward to prove (see appendix) that the (normalized) end-of period financial 
stocks can be written as: 
(E26) b = [b-1•(1+ib-1) + γ - θ•u ] / (1 + g
i); 
(E27) vh = [ψ1•vh-1 + (1-θ)•￿•π•u + ψ2•b-1]/ (1 + g
i - δ); 
(E28) d = (1- δ)•vh, 
(E29) l = d - b; and 
(E30) vf = 1 - δ•vh ￿ l;  
where,  
ψ1 = [1 - a - δ + (1- ￿)•(1 - δ)•i-1]; 
ψ2 = ib-1 - (1-￿) •i-1;  
and b, vh, d, l, and vf stand for their uppercase counterparts normalized by the (current) 
value of the capital stock (i.e. l = L/p•K;  l-1 = L-1/p•K-1; and so on). 
Now note that if b and vh are known, then d, vf and l are easily determined by 
equations (E28)-(E30) above. As a consequence, the solution of the model can be 
represented by the following (buv) system: 
(E26) b = [b-1•(1+ib-1) + γ - θ•u ] / (1 + g
i); 
(E6) u =  [a•vh-1 + go - θ1•i  + γ] / [1 - (1 - π)•(1-θ) - (α•π + β)]; 
                                                     
29 Assuming, naturally, that the economy is below full capacity utilization. The discussion of inflation is 
postponed to part 4.   
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(E27) vh = [ψ1•vh-1 + (1-θ)•￿•π•u + ψ2•b-1]/ (1 + g
i - δ); 
so the temporary equilibria of the system has the clear-cut graphic representation below
30, 
 
and, again, the (period) comparative statics exercises are straightforward.  As a matter of 
fact, the model admits a convenient recursive solution.  Given u (which can be calculated 
directly from the initial stocks, monetary and fiscal policies and distribution and other 
parameters), one can easily get b and vh and, given these last two variables, one can then 
calculate l, d and vf (and, therefore, q
31).   
 
3.1 2  A Numerical Example
32 
Despite the unfriendly appearance of the algebra above, the functioning of the artificial 
economy it describes is expected to be fairly intuitive to anyone familiar with the 
Keynesian tradition. Suppose, for example, the given initial stocks and set of parameters 
and initial conditions (and make p = 1): 
                                                     
30 The positions of the buv curves are determined by history and, therefore, change every period. We note, 
however, that the vh curve will be higher then the b curve in all relevant cases. To see that, one must first 
note (from consolidating the balance sheets in table 1) that b + 1 ≡ vh + vf. Since the maximum (relevant) 
value of vf is 1 (assuming that both loans and the price of equity go to zero, and firms do not accumulate 
financial assets), it is easy to see that vh has to be bigger than b. The appendix discusses the slopes of the l, 
b, and vh curves.  
31 For Tobin￿s q ≡ 1- vf 
32 This section follows Godley and Cripps￿s (1983) approach to numerical simulation very closely.   
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1-Central Bank Advances          0  0  0 
2-Bank Deposits                      +170   -170    0 
4-Bank Loans            -170  +170    0 
5-Bills        0  0  0 
6-Capital Goods         +200     +200 
7-Equities   +30 -30      0 
8-Net Worth (Column Totals)   200 0  0  0  +200 
 
Χ  i ￿b  γ  go  α  β 
1 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.015 0.3  0
θ1 a  ￿   θ  π  δ  pe 
0.1 0.03 0.75 0.25 0.2 0.15 .15
 
A stylized story of what ￿happens￿ in any given period would go as follows:  
1 ￿ In the classic ￿circuitist￿ tradition (e.g. of Graziani, 2003), firms are assumed 
to get bank loans to finance production (in the beginning of the period). Since they are 
assumed to get the point of effective demand right they get a $100 loan. In fact, from 
(E6) it is easy to prove that: 
p•X = u•p•K-1=[.03•1 +.015 ￿(.1•.05) + .13] /[1 - (1 ￿ .2)•(1-.25)- (.03•.2 + 0)] •200= 100. 
Now the banks￿ balance sheet consists of bank loans to firms of $270 (i.e. 170+100) and 
firms￿ deposits of 100 (0+100) plus households￿ deposits of 170.   
2 ￿ Firms pay wages of $80 (.8•100) with bank checks, so the firms￿ bank deposits 
are now $20 (100-80), while households￿ deposits reach $250 (170 + 80).  
3 ￿ Households spend money in consumption goods (0.75•80 + .03•200  = $66) 
and pay their taxes (0.25•80= $20) using bank checks. So households￿ deposits go down 
(to $164 = 250-66 -20), while firms￿ loans go down to $204 (270 - 66) as firms use their 
receipts to pay down their debt with banks. Finally, government deposits (in the amount 
of  $20) are created.       
4 ￿ The government buys goods from firms (.13•200 = $26) using bank checks 
and pays the service of its debt to banks (0.05•0= $0), so that its deposits go to zero and it  
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has to give $6 in T-bills to banks. The firms again use the receipts to pay down their debt, 
which therefore goes down to $178 (204￿ 26).    
5 - Firms use their deposits ($20) to pay their profit taxes ($5 = 0.25•20) to the 
government, their debt service ($8.50 = 0.05•170) to banks, and distribute profits ($4.88 = 
0.75•(20 - 5 - 8.50)) to households, using retained earnings ($1.62 = 0.25•(20 - 5 - 8.50)) 
to cut down their loans (to $176.38 = 178 ￿ 1.62). The government uses the firms￿ tax 
money to buy back ($5 in) government bills from banks (cutting down its debt to $1 = 6-
5), while households￿ deposits reach $177.38 (164 + 3.40 + 5.10 + 4.88), increased by 
interest payments on their deposits ($3.40) and distributed profits of banks ($5.10) and 
firms ($4.88).     
6 - Firms get money from selling new equity to households. To know exactly how  
much firms make selling new equity note that the equilibrium in the stock market 
happens when pe = .15•Vh/(χ•K) (E15). Note also that since χ =1, we have that E = K = 
200•(1 + gi). But we know (from (E5), u, and the parameters above) that gi =.04, so K = 
208. From these two facts one can conclude that pe•=.15•Vh /208. Finally, from the 
budget constraint of households (see tables 2 and 3 above) we know that Vh= Vh-1+ SAVh 
+∆pe•E-1, so that Vh = $200 + $7.38 (= SAVh  = 177.38 - 170 = the increase in 
households￿ bank deposits so far)+ .15•Vh•200/208 ￿ $30, or equivalently, Vh ≈ 207.2, so 
that pe drops to 0.149. As a consequence, firms get $1.19 (≈ 0.149*8) from households in 
new equities. These purchases allow firms to reduce their loans to $175.19 (= 176.38 ￿ 
1.19), while simultaneously reducing households￿ deposits to $ 176.19 (= 177.38 ￿ 1.19). 
Interestingly enough, firms￿ retained earnings ($1.62) and the fall in stock prices 
combined to cause the net worth of firms to get positive ($1.8 ≈ 208 ￿ 175.19 - .149•208).   
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So, in the end of period 1, one has the following new balance sheets: 





1-Central Bank Advances          0  0 0 
2-Bank Deposits                      +176.19   -176.19    0 
4-Bank Loans            -175.19 +175.19    0 
5-Bills        +1  -1 0 
6-Capital Goods         +208      +208 
7-Equities   +31 -31      0 
8-Net Worth (Column Totals)   207.19 1.8  0  -1  +208 
 
3.2  The ￿Long Period￿ (i.e. Steady-State) Equilibrium and Its Interpretation 
The  ￿buv￿  system also allows one to understand what would happen in the artificial 
economy described above if its parameters would remain constant through a sufficiently 
big number of periods. As we saw above, both the capacity utilization and the 
(normalized) balance sheets of the economy are completely determined by policy 
distribution and behavioral parameters (which are all, by hypothesis, constant) and the 
(normalized) beginning of period stocks of household wealth and public debt. Under a 
given set of circumstances, the stock-flow system described above will converge (at a 
speed determined by its parameters) to a ￿long period￿ steady-state in which both u, pe 
and the normalized balance sheets of the economy are constant. All one has to do to 
calculate this ￿long period equilibrium￿ is to solve the buv system above under the 
assumptions that vh = vh-1 = vh* and l = l-1 = l* (see the appendix, for a discussion). In the 
case of the numerical example given above, for instance, the system converges to its 
steady state after approximately 200 quarters (see below)
33.  
                                                     
33 That is to say, after 200 periods like the one described in the example above have come to pass. For 
scaling reasons, the dynamics of u would not be clear in the graph above. From (E6), however, we know 





















Naturally enough, no one expects the economy to eventually reach this steady-
state, for the very good reason that no one expects its parameters to remain constant for 
200 quarters
34. Having a ceteris paribus idea of where the economy is heading is an 
important input in assessing the likelihood of future changes, though. If, say, one notes 
that the loan to capital ratio is growing without bounds or is tending to a very high level, 
he or she will have every reason to suspect that some structural or parametric change will 
happen in the system to prevent these outcomes
35.   
To be sure, in the Post-Keynesian world described above a lot of things are 
expected to change every single period. Expectations, for example, are assumed to affect 
both the investment function and the portfolio choice of households (and, therefore, the 
financial conditions of firms and households). The economy can easily find itself (or be 
put) in unsustainable situations (i.e. those in which the steady-state is not stable or 
implying very high, or low, stock-flow ratios
36), e.g. if the government fixes the interest 
rate on public debt higher than the growth rate of the economy (as it is often the case in 
Latin America), or if enthusiastic entrepreneurs force the loans to capital ratio to very 
high levels (as Minsky, 1982, 1986, would have put it). We believe the framework above 
                                                     
34 Though note that considerably faster adjustments can happen.  
35 As noted by Godley and Cripps (1983, p. 42) it is reasonable to assume that ￿stock variables will not 
change indefinitely as ratios to the related flow variables.￿ In the same vein, Minsky (e.g. 1982) used stock 
(of debt and liquid assets)-flow of (disposable income) ratios as proxies for the ￿financial fragility￿ of 
institutional sectors.     
36 The stability of the buv system cannot, of course, be taken for granted. The system is highly non-linear 
for several reasons, one of which being that ￿regime changes￿ necessarily happen whenever a stock reaches 
zero.     
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provides a simple formal way to tell these and other classical Structuralist/Post-
Keynesian path-dependency ￿long run￿ stories
37.  
 
4  A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF EXTENSIONS AND SIMPLIFICATIONS OF THE 
MODEL 
 
Whether or not the model presented above achieves a good blend of realism and 
simplicity is debatable. This section aims to help the reader to form an opinion discussing 
possible extensions and a major simplifying assumption￿i.e. the hypothesis that firms￿ 
net worth is zero (associated with the Modigliani-Miller, 1958, theorem). 
 
4.1.1 ￿ More Complex Investment and Consumption Functions 
  Keynesians often assume that g
i is a function of a number of financial variables. 
Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002, L&G from now on), for example, propose to include 
Tobin￿s  q, the loan to capital ratio and the retained earnings to capital ratio as 
determinants of g
i. While we do prefer to model credit constraints in the supply of loans 
(see section 4.1.2 below), we note that the buv structure above is robust to the adoption of 
a L&G￿s specification. To see this let us assume, a la L&G, that:     
(E5a) g
i(π, u, i) = go + (α•π + β)•u + η1•q-1 - η2•i •l-1 + η3•Fu/p•K-1;  
where q = (pe•E + L)/p•K is Tobin￿s q  and η1, η2,  η3 are fixed positive parameters.  
Now, from (E7) and (E13) it is easy to show that:   
g
i(π, u, i) = go+ φ1•u + φ2•l-1 + η1• δ•vh-1;  
where φ1 = α•π + β + η3•(1- ￿)•(1-θ)•π, and φ2 = η1- η2•i  - η3•(1- ￿)•i-1. 
In other words, L&G￿s specification only adds on l-1 (i.e. (1-  δ-1)•vh-1  - b-1) to the 
determinants of u and causes the latter to depend on vh-1 in a more complex way than 
before. In sum, the new specification only makes the buv system more complex. The 
same reasoning applies also to a wide range of consumption functions, as long as the 
                                                     
37 Taylor (2004, p. 258) notes that ￿the trouble with most macroeconomic models of finance is that they 
don￿t let anything interesting happen.￿ We tried to make sure that this is not the case here.   
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propensity to save out of wealth is the same for both capitalist and production workers
38. 
It is easy to see also that the inclusion of current values of, say, q in the investment 
function or vh in the consumption function would change the buv curves in such a way 
that the system no longer would admit the recursive solution discussed above.  
 
4.1.2  The ￿Credit Crunch￿ Regime and Minskyan crises 
It is also common in the Keynesian literature to find the hypothesis that the maximum 
supply of bank loans to firms depends on the interest rate on loans, on the business cycle 
and on the financial fragility of firms
39. If this is the case, and assuming (as Stiglitz and 
Greenwald, 2003) that the interest rate on loans does not ￿clear￿ the market
40, i.e. that: 
L
d = (1 + i-1 - ￿ •i-1)•L-1 + g
i•p•K-1 - pe•g
i•χ•K-1 - (1- ￿)•π•u•p•K-1 > L
s( i, u, l-1); 
it is easy to show that g
i has to adjust to make sure that L
d =  L
s. Formally, this means 
replacing (E5) above by:  
(E5b) g
i =  [l
s - (1+ i-1 - ￿ •i-1)•l-1  + (1- ￿)•π•u] / (1 - l
s - δ•vh)  
and, of course, replacing (E6), (E27), and (E29) by 
(E6a)u ={a•vh-1+γ +[l
s- (1+i-1 - ￿•i-1)•l-1 ]/(1- l
s- δ•vh)}/{θ•(1- π)+ π - [(1- ￿)•π/(1- l
s- δ•vh)]};   
(E27a) vh = (l + b)/(1- δ); and 
(E29a) l = l
s(i, u, l-1);  so the buv system becomes a blu one.  
It so happens that replacing (E5b) in the goods￿ market equilibrium condition 
causes u to depend in a rather complex way on current and lagged values of vh and l 
(E6a), so that the (now) blu system no longer admits a simple recursive solution. This 
￿credit crunch￿ story seems to us at least as faithful to Minsky￿s (and Keynes￿s) writings 
as the ones told by the so-called ￿formal Minskyan literature￿ (Dos Santos, 2004a), 
which usually place the burden of producing Minskyan crises on the investment 
specification
41.      
                                                     
38 If workers consume relatively more or less of their wealth than capitalists, we would have to disaggregate 
household wealth in capitalists￿ and workers￿ wealth, introducing an additional stock variable to the model. 
The same happens if we want to incorporate household debt into the analysis.      
39 See, among others Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) and Delli Gatti et al. (1994).  
40 For in that case the interest rate on loans would be endogenous, fluctuating to make L
d = L
s.  
41 While ￿Minskyan results￿ can be caused by fluctuations in both lenders’ and borrowers’ risks, the ￿formal 
Minskyan literature￿ (initiated by Taylor and O’Connel, 1985) has either emphasized the latter over the 
former or worked with ￿reduced form￿ investment functions in which both are described by the same 
variables. The ￿credit crunch￿ regime above does the opposite, i.e. it depicts an extreme situation in which 
expectations are such that the ￿lenders￿ risk￿ curve becomes vertical. That both Minsky himself and  
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4.1.3  More Complex Financial Structures  
What if the financial architecture discussed above is enriched to include high-powered 
money, holdings of T-bills by families and central bank advances to banks? Table 4 
below depicts the balance sheets of this more complex economy
42.   
Neglecting possible differences in taxation, the economy below differs from the 
one discussed in the previous sections in three major ways. First, it implies a more 
complex portfolio choice for households (who now have to choose among four instead of 
two assets) and a potentially more complex determination of capitalist households￿ 
income (given that the interest rates on deposits may differ from the interest rate on T-
bills). Second it implies a more complex role for banks, which now can hold money and 
T-bills (being required by the central bank to hold a given minimum amount of high-
powered money). Third, it (trivially) changes the budget constraint of the government, for 
now a part of the public debt is free of charge.  
 
Table 4: Balance sheets of a more complex artificial economy 




money                      
+Hh    +Hb  -H    0 
2-Central Bank 
advances          
  -A  +A    0 
3-Bank Deposits        +D   -D      0 
4-Bank Loans            -L  +L      0 
5-T-Bills      +Bh   +Bb  +Bc  -B  0 
6-Capital Goods         +p•K        +p•K 
7-Equities   +E•pe -E•pe       0 
8-Net Worth 
(Column Totals)       
+ Vh  + Vf  0  0  -B  +p•K 
   
                                                                                                                                                            
Keynes were well aware of this latter possibility is clear in Minsky (1975, p.119). See also Keynes (1937, 
p.668-9).       
42 A detailed discussion of such an economy, and of how several schools of Keynesian thought rationalized 
its behavior, can be found in Dos Santos (2004b).    
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To see what is implied by the first two changes, consider the (Zezza and Dos 
Santos, 2004) case in which: 
pe•E
d = δ1•(Vh - Hh
d); 
D
d = δ2•(Vh - Hh
d) = D
s = D; 
Bh
d =(1 - δ1 - δ2)•(Vh - Hh
d) = Bh; 
Hh
d = a1•u•p•K-1 = Hh; and   
Hb
d = a2•D = Hb  
It is now easy to see that the model now implies more complex specifications for both pe 
and the SAVh and Vh functions. Beginning with the first, note that the new stock market 
equilibrium condition is: 
pe•E
d = δ1•(Vh - Hh
d) = pe•E
s = pe•χ•K; 
so that pe = (p• δ1•vh/χ) - [δ1•a1•u•p/χ•(1 + g
i)]
43.  
Moreover, banks￿ stock of loanable funds is reduced in this economy, for two basic 
reasons: (i) households keep a part of their non-equity wealth in T-bills (so the amount of 
bank deposits gets smaller); and (ii) banks are required to hold a fraction a2 of their total 
deposits D in high-powered money. So, the relevant equation for Bb becomes:  
Bb = Max [0, (1-a2)•D ￿ L], and, of course,  
A = - Min [0, (1-a2)•D ￿ L]
44 (i.e. A is one and the same as a negative Bb).  
As a consequence, we have now two ￿regimes￿ in the model, i.e. one in which Bb is 
positive and another in which A is positive (presumably increasing the likelihood of the 
credit crunch regime
45). If the interest rate on central bank advances and T-bills differ, 
each of these regimes will imply a different Fb equation and, therefore, different SAVh 
and Vh equations. But given that A and Bb are straightforward functions of Vh, L and u, 
the model will still collapse to a buv system.         
 
4.1.4  Inflation, Productivity and Distribution of Income  
As mentioned before, the ￿fix-price￿ algebra above assumes implicitly that capacity 
utilization does not reach its technical maximum. The model could easily incorporate a 
                                                     
43 As opposed to pe = (p•δ•vh/χ) in the simplified model.  
44 The specification above implies either that the interest on T-bills is smaller than the interest on central 
bank￿s advances or, if that is not the case, that the central bank monitors banks to ensure they do not get 
advances to finance purchases of T-bills.     
45 Especially if the central bank sets the interest rate on rediscount loans at punitive levels.   
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￿forced savings￿ regime (as discussed by Taylor, 1991, p.47), as well as a wide range of 
(orthodox and heterodox) hypotheses about nominal wage, mark up and technical 
progress dynamics.  
  More importantly from our perspective, a serious treatment of inflation would 
require the model to be solved in ￿real￿ (i.e. deflated) terms. As discussed in section 1 
above, this is straightforward for the flows but requires that the equations for all the 
financial stocks assumed above are changed to include the ￿real capital gains￿ formulas 
discussed in page 5
46. Finally, it is quite obvious that ceteris paribus inflation will hurt 
creditors (i.e. households and banks) and benefit debtors (i.e. firms and the government). 
If large enough, it is likely to change the behavior of these sectors
47, though it should now 
be obvious to the reader that these changes will not hurt the general (and now ￿real￿) buv 
structure, only make it more complex.                    
 
4.1.5  What if Vf = 0?    
In this case the vh function (and the buv system) gets considerably simpler. Indeed, 
consolidating the balance sheets in table 1 above one gets: 
Vh ≡ p•K + B,  
or, equivalently,  
(E27b) vh  ≡ 1 + b.    
  But how can this new result be reconciled with our previous hypotheses? 
Essentially, the answer to this question is that δ now gets endogenous, so the household 
sector as a whole is supposed to always adjust their demand for equities to make sure it is 
paying exactly what the firms are worth. To see this formally, note first that from the 
firms￿ balance sheet we have that:     
p•K ≡ L + pe•E. 
Plugging the firms￿ loan demand (E16) in the identity above (and assuming χ = χ-1), one 
gets:  
p•K ≡ (1 + i-1 - ￿ •i-1)•L-1 + g
i•p•K-1 - pe•g
i•χ•K-1  ￿ (1- ￿)•(1-θ)•π•u•p•K-1+ pe•E; 
or, rearranging: 
                                                     
46 So that the stock equations are altered. As the required changes are both simple, tedious, and do not 
affect the gist of our argument, we will not discuss them in this text.    
47 For instance, inducing households to buy equity as opposed to holding purely financial assets￿the so-
called ￿Tobin-effect￿ (Walsh, 1998, p.42).    
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pe = (p /χ)•[1- l-1•(1- i-1 - ￿ •i-1)  + (1- ￿)•(1-θ)•π•u]; so that  
δ•Vh = δ•(p•K + B) = pe•E = (p /χ)•[1- l-1•(1- i-1 - ￿ •i-1)  + (1- ￿)•π•u] •E; 
or, after further rearranging: 
δ = pe•E/ Vh = p•K•[1- l-1•(1- i-1 - ￿ •i-1)  + (1- ￿)•π•u] / (p•K + B). 
 
5  FINAL REMARKS 
 
In the sections above we presented a simplified stock-flow consistent post-Keynesian 
growth model and related it to the existing (structuralist and post-Keynesian) liter-
ature(s)
48. We are well aware that the specific derivations above depend crucially on the 
simplifying assumptions we made. We note, however, that the general buv/blu structure 
discussed above appears to be robust to wide changes in the flow specifications and/or 
financial architecture assumed￿a point that, as far as we know, has not received enough 
attention in the aforementioned literatures.   
Of course, little in this paper is theoretically new. Borrowing words from Foley 
and Sidrauski (1971, p. 6), our goal here was mostly to provide the reader with a rigorous 
and didactic ￿exposition of an eclectic tradition that strikes us as particularly coherent 
and logically convincing.￿ It is up to the reader to decide whether or not we have 
succeeded.     
                                                     
48 The relation of this kind of modeling with mainstream macroeconomics was discussed in Dos Santos 
(2004b) and, more generally, in Taylor (2004).   
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As the u curve was derived earlier in the text, we begin by deriving the b and vh curves. 
 
A.1 ￿ The b curve 
From (E19) and (E24) we have that: 
(A.1.1) B = (1 + ib-1)•B-1 + γ•p•K-1 -  θ•p•X; 
or, dividing everything by p•K-1,  
(A.1.2) b•(1 + g
i)  = (1 + ib-1)•b-1 + γ -  θ•u,  
where: 
b-1 = B-1/(p•K-1), and 
b = B/(p•K). 
It is now straightforward to see that:  




A.2 ￿The vh curve 
From (E10), (E12) and (E21) we have that: 
(A.2.1) Vh = (1 - a)•Vh-1 + ￿ •(1-θ)• π•u•p•K-1 + (1- ￿)•i-1•L-1+ ib-1•B-1 +∆pe•E-1; 
Moreover, from (E11) and (E15) (and assuming that δ-1 = δ and χ = χ-1) we have that:  
(A.2.2.) ∆pe•E-1 = δ•Vh/(1 + g
i) -  δ•Vh-1; 
and from the balance sheets of banks and (E8) we know that  
(A.2.3.) L-1 = (1 - δ)•Vh-1  - B-1; 
So, replacing (A.2.2) and (A.2.3) in (A.2.1) and rearranging, we get: 
(A.2.4)Vh=[1-a- δ+(1- δ)•(1- ￿)•i-1]•Vh-1+ ￿ •(1-θ)• π•u•p•K-1+[ib-1 -(1- ￿)•i-1]•B-1 + δ •Vh/(1+g
i) 
or, dividing both sides by p•K-1,   
(A.2.5)Vh/p•K-1 = ψ1•vh-1+ ￿ •(1-θ)• π•u + ψ2•b-1 + δ •vh;  
where: 
ψ1 = [1- a - δ + (1- ￿)•(1 - δ)•i-1]; 
ψ2 = ib-1 - (1 - ￿) •i-1; 
 b-1 = B-1/(p•K-1);  
vh-1 = Vh-1/(p•K-1); and 
                                                     
49 So that a necessary condition for the stability of the buv system is that g > ib-1.  
  28
vh = Vh/(p•K).  
As (by definition) Vh/p•K-1 = vh•(1+g
i), it is now straightforward to show that:  




A.3 ￿ The slope of the b and vh curves 
All one needs to do to get the slopes of the curves above (depicted in section 3.1.1) is to 
derive them with respect to u.  It is intuitively clear, however, that ∂b/∂u < 0 for increases 
in the economic activity generates increases in investment (and therefore capital growth) 
and in tax revenues, and both factors contribute to a smaller b. It so happens that ∂vh/∂u 
is also negative for a wide range of parameters and initial conditions. Indeed, increases in 
real activity have only a relatively modest positive impact on the stock of households￿ 
wealth (through its impact on the distributed profits of firms and, therefore, on 
households￿ income and saving) and affect the growth of the capital stock importantly 
(therefore affecting vh = Vh/p•K negatively)
51. Finally, given that b and vh completely 
determine l, it is clear that ∂l/∂u also tends to be negative.    
 
A.4 ￿ The steady-state solution of the buv system 
All one needs to do to get the steady state solution of the buv system is to solve it 
assuming that vh = vh-1 and b = b-1. It is then relatively easy to show that the 
characteristic equation of the system is cubic (what is unsurprising given the non-
linearites in the buv system), potentially allowing for multiple (i.e. up to 3) ￿long run￿ 
equilibria. In the numeric example discussed in the text, however, two of the roots of the 
system were imaginary, so the steady-state solution depicted in section 3.2 was the only 
real one.   
                                                     
50 So that a necessary condition for the stability of the buv system is that  ψ1/•(1+g
i ￿ δ) < 1, or 
equivalently that g >(1- ￿)•(1 - δ)•i-1- a.  
51 This point can be seen formally. Indeed, it is easy to prove that ∂vh/∂u<0 when vh >￿•(1-θ)•π/(α•π+ β). 
In other words, the slope of vh can only be positive when distributed profits are big and accelerator effects 
small.   